


































Does the implicit outcomes expectancies shape learning and memory
processes?






Cyswllt i'r cyhoeddiad / Link to publication
Dyfyniad o'r fersiwn a gyhoeddwyd / Citation for published version (APA):
Carmona, I., Mari-Beffa, P., & Estevez, A. F. (2019). Does the implicit outcomes expectancies
shape learning and memory processes? Cognition, 189, 181-187.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.007
Hawliau Cyffredinol / General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or
other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal
requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private
study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
 11. May. 2021
 
 
Does the implicit outcomes expectancies shape learning and memory processes? 
 
Isabel Carmona1, Paloma Marí-Beffa2, and Angeles F. Estévez1,3* 
 1 Department of Psychology, Universidad de Almería, Spain 
2 School of Psychology, Bangor University, UK 









Angeles F. Estévez 
CERNEP Research Center  
Universidad de Almería 
04120 Almería, Spain 






Does the explicit or implicit knowledge about the consequences of our choices shape 2 
learning and memory processes? This seems to be the case according to previous studies 3 
demonstrating improvements in learning and retention of symbolic relations and in 4 
visuospatial recognition memory when each correct choice is reinforced with its own 5 
unique and explicit outcome (the differential outcomes procedure, DOP). In the present 6 
study, we aim to extend these findings by exploring the impact of the DOP under 7 
conditions of non-conscious processing. To test for this, both the outcomes (Experiment 8 
1A) and the sample stimuli (Experiment 1B) were presented under subliminal (non-9 
conscious) and supraliminal conditions in a delayed visual recognition memory task. 10 
Results from both experiments showed a better visual recognition memory when 11 
participants were trained with the DOP regardless the awareness of the outcomes or 12 
even of the stimuli used for training. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration 13 
that the DOP can be effective under unconscious conditions. This finding is discussed in 14 
the light of the two-memory systems model developed by Savage and colleagues to 15 
explain the beneficial effects observed on learning and memory when differential 16 
outcomes are applied. 17 
 18 
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 31 
We are continually making choices throughout our lives, choices that are usually 32 
followed by different consequences. For example, when crossing the road, the green 33 
light coincides with cars stopping allowing you to cross the road safely; on the contrary, 34 
the red light could be paired with cars passing, making road crossing a riskier option. In 35 
such situations, could the explicit or implicit knowledge of the consequences of our 36 
choices shape the way we learn and memorize information about them? This is a crucial 37 
question that has been indirectly and only partially addressed by research investigating 38 
the effect of administering differential (or specific) outcomes versus non-differential (or 39 
random) outcomes in discriminative learning tasks, and, more recently, in working 40 
memory.  41 
The simple manipulation of administering differential outcomes, paring a unique 42 
outcome with each target stimulus or each correct stimulus-response sequence, is 43 
known as the differential outcomes procedure (DOP). To better understand this, let us 44 
consider a group of participants having to perform a delayed facial recognition task. 45 
That is, they have to remember faces that they have just seen (e.g., a man with a black 46 
beard, and a man with red hair and a moustache) and respond after a delay by selecting 47 
them among a group of distractor faces. When the DOP is applied, the correct 48 
recognition of each face is followed by a specific outcome. For example, participants 49 
only get the feedback “well done” when they correctly identify the face of the man with 50 
a black beard. Next, if the face is now the man with red hair and a moustache, the 51 
phrase “fantastic” will appear exclusively paired with it. By contrast, under the non-52 
differential outcomes condition (NOP) there is not a predetermined and specific 53 
association between the faces and the outcomes. Therefore, participants receive a 54 
random phrase (e.g. “well done” or “fantastic”) following their correct responses. 55 
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Previous studies have demonstrated that the DOP is effective in optimizing 56 
discriminative learning and visuospatial recognition memory in healthy people (e.g., 57 
Easton, 2004; Esteban, Vivas, Fuentes, & Estévez, 2015; Estévez et al., 2007; López-58 
Crespo, Plaza, Fuentes, & Estévez, 2009; Martínez, Estévez, Fuentes, & Overmier, 59 
2009; Miller, Waugh, & Chambers, 2002; Mok & Overmier, 2007; Molina, Plaza, 60 
Fuentes, & Estévez, 2015; Plaza, Estévez, López-Crespo, & Fuentes, 2011; Plaza, 61 
Molina, Fuentes, & Estévez, 2018). The DOP also helps to improve the same cognitive 62 
processes in populations with neurocognitive deficits (e.g., Carmona, Vivas, & Estévez, 63 
2019; Esteban, Plaza, López-Crespo, Vivas, & Estévez, 2014; Estévez, Fuentes, 64 
Overmier, & González, 2003; Hochhalter, Sweeney, Bakke, Holub, & Overmier, 2000; 65 
Joseph, Overmier, & Thompson, 1997; Martínez et al., 2012; Plaza, López-Crespo, 66 
Antúnez, Fuentes, & Estévez, 2012). Taken together, these findings indicate that the 67 
DOP is a very promising, economic, and effective technique; which can be applied in 68 
diverse settings, such as schools and mental health clinics.  69 
It is worth noting that in all the aforementioned studies, the target stimuli as well 70 
as the outcomes were supraliminally presented thus allowing its explicit processing. 71 
Accordingly, when participants assigned to the DOP condition have been asked which 72 
outcome was paired with each discriminative stimulus following the training, they have 73 
responded correctly (see Maki, Overmier, Delos, & Gutman, 1995). Thus, although the 74 
main goal of these studies has been specifically to explore the potential benefits of the 75 
DOP on learning and memory in different populations, it could be said that, based on 76 
their procedures, both processes are affected by the explicit or conscious knowledge of 77 
the outcomes. However, no studies have addressed whether the unconscious knowledge 78 
of the consequences of our choices would equally influence learning and memory. If so, 79 
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this finding would have relevant applied implications with strong significance for 80 
current theories. 81 
To our knowledge, very little research has been done on the cognitive and neural 82 
mechanisms underlying the DOP, particularly in humans. The most accepted 83 
explanation with the strongest empirical support is the one proposed by Savage and 84 
colleages (e.g., Savage, Pitking, & Careri, 1999; Savage, 2001; Savage, & Ramos, 85 
2009) based on animal research. This theory, the two-memory systems model, suggests 86 
that there are two different memory systems: (i) prospective, activated when the DOP is 87 
applied; and (ii) retrospective, activated when the outcomes are not specific of the 88 
associations to be learned or of the target stimuli (the NOP condition). Continuing with 89 
the previous example, an implicit association between the target stimulus (e.g., a man 90 
with a black beard) and its unique outcome (e.g., the phrase “well done”) is established 91 
under the DOP condition. A Pavlovian association like this is responsible for creating 92 
unique reward expectancies (or implicit-prospective memory representations of the 93 
forthcoming outcome). This prospective memory system is largely implicit and has 94 
been linked to the functioning of glutamatergic pathways by Savage and colleagues. 95 
After several training trials, the presentation of the target stimulus automatically 96 
activates the expectancy of its unique outcome. This expectancy (or Pavolovian 97 
conditioned anticipatory state) has discriminative or functional stimulus-like properties 98 
and, therefore, can be used to guide the selection of the correct response independent of 99 
target stimulus information (e.g., Overmier, Savage, & Sweeney, 1999; Savage, 100 
Buzzetti, & Ramirez, 2004). Noteworthy, expectancies are also functionally different 101 
thant rememberign a past event. For instance, they are more persistent than retrospective 102 
memories (e.g., Overmier, Savage, & Sweeney, 1999) and are unaffected by 103 
hippocampal lesions (e.g., Savage et al., 2004). A theoretical assumption of the two-104 
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memory systems model is that the Pavolovian-induced expectancy  of the forthcoming 105 
outcome is maintained throughout the delay interval in delayed matching-to-sample 106 
tasks. In other words, the unique expectancy of the phrase “well done” facilitates the 107 
subsequent recognition of the face of a man with a black beard after the delay, without a 108 
representation of such stimulus being activated and maintained in working memory. By 109 
contrast, when the NOP is applied, there is no specific information available about the 110 
forthcoming outcomes so participants would have to remember the target stimulus they 111 
have just seen (e.g., the face of a man with a black beard) during the delay to correctly 112 
solve the task. This process would require a retrospective memory system associated 113 
with the hippocampus that is dependent on Acetylcholine.  114 
There has been only one study exploring the basic mechanisms underlying the 115 
DOP in humans using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and the results 116 
seem to support the two memory systems model. Mok, Thomas, Lungu, and Overmier 117 
(2009), using a delayed matching-to-sample task with young adults, observed that 118 
separate brain regions are recruited when differential or non-differential outcomes are 119 
used. Namely, when DOP was used, the lateral posterior parietal cortex, and more 120 
specifically the angular gyrus, was activated during the blank delay between the offset 121 
of the sample stimulus and the onset of the choice stimuli. By contrast, when the NOP 122 
was applied, greater hippocampal (medial temporal lobe) activation was observed. 123 
Furthermore, in the DOP condition, areas specific to the sensorial processing of the 124 
outcome (auditory vs. visual), were also activated during this delay. These findings 125 
were used to suggest that the expectation of an outcome, elicited by the sample 126 
stimulus, may indeed be represented in prospective memory. In an extension of this 127 
study, Mok (2012) argued that short-term retrospective (NOP) and prospective (DOP) 128 
memory processes (i) are mediated by two different subsets of the default brain network 129 
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(the medial temporal lobe would be involved in monitoring what has just happened –the 130 
cue or sample stimulus- whereas the lateral parietal lobe would be implicated in 131 
prospective processing of what is forthcoming –the outcome-) and (ii) might be 132 
spontaneously engaged not requiring a deliberate and effortful activation. 133 
Despite current support to the idea that the DOP stimulates implicit memory 134 
systems, and thus is largely unaffected by consciousness and explicit expectations, this 135 
aspect has remained a theoretical assumption and has never been tested. The present 136 
study will provide first evidence on the role of awareness in the DOP with important 137 
implications for theoretical models and its applications in humans. To do so,  both the 138 
outcomes (Experiment 1A) and the sample stimuli (Experiment 1B) will be presented 139 
under subliminal (non-conscious) and supraliminal (conscious) conditions in a delayed 140 
visual recognition memory task. Subliminal presentation aims to eliminate the 141 
subjective visibility of the stimuli by masking and displaying them for a few 142 
milliseconds (e.g., Breitmeyer & Ogmen, 2006). The provided information is therefore 143 
inaccessible to consciousness and it cannot be reported (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, 144 
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006), although their processing still can be boosted by increasing 145 
attention to them (Dehaene et al., 2006). By contrast, supraliminal presentation allows 146 
the subjective visibility of the stimuli and its access to consciousness. According to the 147 
two-memory systems theory, we should observe the beneficial effect of applying the 148 
DOP under conditions of non-conscious processing, since (i) the association established 149 
between the sample stimulus and the specific outcome is formed via an implicit process 150 
(Pavlovian associations) and (ii) the activation and maintenance of these reward 151 
expectancies also depends on an implicit prospective memory system. Thus, we should 152 
observe a similar magnitude of the DOP effect under subliminal or supraliminal 153 
presentations of either the cue stimulus or the outcome. 154 
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Regarding to the NOP condition, we propose two possible hypotheses. 1) If, as 155 
the two-memory systems theory indicated, explicit processing is required to maintain 156 
active the memory of the cue during the delay, performance should improve (faster 157 
and/or more accurate) with the supraliminal condition as compared to the subliminal 158 
one. This is due, among other factors, to the superior encoding of supraliminal 159 
visuospatial information (Salti et al., 2015).  2) By contrast, if, as Mok (2012) 160 
suggested, this retrospective process can be spontaneously engaged (without a 161 
deliberate intention and depending on the default brain network), then it is possible that 162 
the subliminal processing of the cue would be enough to activate it. If this was the case, 163 
then performance should be equivalent in both conditions (subliminal vs. supraliminal). 164 
Finally, according to Savage and colleagues, since the NOP does not depend on the 165 
expectancy of the outcomes and is activated by retrospective memory, responses in the 166 
delayed visual recognition task should be the same regardless of how the outcomes are 167 
presented (subliminally vs. supraliminally) in the NOP condition.  168 
Experiments 1A and 1B 169 
The main aim of these experiments was to test whether the DOP would still 170 
improve visual recognition memory in healthy adults with subliminal (unconscious) 171 
presentations applied either to the outcomes (Experiment 1A) or to the sample stimuli 172 
(Experiment 1B). To do so, reaction times (RTs) and accuracy were measured to 173 
compare subliminal and supraliminal conditions in both experiments. 174 
Method 175 
Participants. In the two experiments included here, participants were 176 
undergraduates from the University of Almería (Spain). We conducted a priori power 177 
analysis with the G*Power software 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) to 178 
determine the minimum required sample size to detect both main effects and 179 
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interactions (between-subjects factors). With an alpha = .05 and power = .80, the 180 
analysis revealed that thirty-six participants were required to detect a small-medium 181 
effect size (d=0.44). The effect size expected is based on previous studies concerning to 182 
the DOP in healthy adults (e.g., Plaza et al., 2018).  183 
Forty-four participants (ranging in age from 18 to 38 years, M = 20.9, SD = 4.9) 184 
and forty-six participants (ranging in age from 18 to 36 years, M = 20.8, SD =3.2) 185 
volunteered in experiments 1A and 1B, respectively. These opportunistic samples 186 
included 10 males and 34 females (Experiment 1A) and 14 males and 32 females 187 
(Experiment 1B). Written informed consent was obtained from all participants. The 188 
study was approved by the University of Almería Human Research Ethics Committee 189 
and was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Participants reported 190 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naïve with respect to the purposes of the 191 
experiment. They received extra course credit for their participation and the chance to 192 
win one of the prizes that were raffled off at the end of the study.   193 
Setting and materials. The stimuli were displayed on a black background on a 194 
colour monitor (15-inch VGA monitor) of an IBM-compatible computer. The E-prime 195 
software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 2012) controlled the stimulus presentation as 196 
well as the collection of the participant’s responses (latency and accuracy data). 197 
Participants were tested individually in quiet rooms with identical sound and lighting 198 
conditions. 199 
The stimuli were six white circular shapes with shaded sectors (see Figure 1 200 
depicting the stimulus sequence) designed by one of the authors (I.C.) with the 201 
AutoCAD software (Autodesk, 2010). Four of them were presented as initial cue stimuli 202 
and the rest as comparison stimuli. The size of the shapes was 3o x 3o of visual angle 203 
and could be displayed either individually at the centre of the screen (sample stimulus), 204 
 10 
 
or in a 2 × 3 grid (comparison stimuli). Four reinforces (a pen drive, a five-euro bill, a 205 
key ring or a set of four pens) were used in the experiment and they were raffled off at 206 
the end of the study. Pictures of these prizes were used as outcomes. They appeared at 207 
the center of the screen along with both a congratulation phrase (“very well”, “well 208 
done”, “congratulations” or “very good”) and the phrase “you may win a” followed by 209 
the name of a reinforcer, after a correct choice. The phrases were in Courier New, size 210 












Figure 1. Stimulus sequence (from left to right) used in Experiment 1A. 223 
Procedure 224 
As a first step, we conducted two pilot studies to make sure that participants 225 
were not able to perceive the stimuli consciously. In the first one (N=62) we tested the 226 
following parameters: (i) stimulus presentation time (17 ms, 33 ms, 50 ms, 67 ms or 80 227 
ms); (ii) pattern mask presentation time (100 ms or 200 ms), and (iii) type of pattern 228 









17 ms Subliminal outcome 
80 ms Supraliminal outcome 
Very well! 
You may win a pen drive 
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outcomes, were displayed for 17 ms, with a double pattern mask (before and after the 230 
stimulus) during 200 ms, all participants informed that they had seen no stimulus. With 231 
33 or 50 ms and the same type of mask, most of the participants reported that they had 232 
seen some of them. Finally, when the stimuli appeared for 67 or 80 ms, all participants 233 
reported full conscious processing. In the second pilot study, we designed a decision 234 
task following the stimulus parameters. Eight circular sample stimuli and eight square 235 
sample stimuli were presented subliminally during 17 ms, with two pattern masks 236 
appearing before and after each of them for 200 ms. Each stimulus appeared twice, so 237 
the total number of trials was 32. For each trial, participants (N= 42) had to decide 238 
whether they had seen a circular or a square shape by pressing the “1” or “2” keys on 239 
the keyboard. Participants knew in advance that there was the same number of circular 240 
and square shapes. The results revealed a performance at chance for all participants 241 
demonstrating no indication of conscious processing of the stimuli. 242 
For the final experiments, participants performed a delayed matching to sample 243 
task (DMTS). As in previous studies (e.g., López-Crespo et al., 2009; Plaza et al., 244 
2012), a variable delay of 5 and 25 seconds was interposed between the offset of the 245 
sample stimulus and the onset of the comparison stimuli in both experiments. The task 246 
lasted approximately 20 minutes.  247 
In Experiment 1A, each participant received the same verbal instructions, also 248 
written on the screen: “First, a central fixation point will appear. Then, it will be 249 
replaced by a circular shape presented for a short time. You must pay attention because, 250 
after a variable delay, you will have to identify the shape that you have just seen out of 251 
six different options by clicking on it with the mouse. When you are ready, please press 252 
the space bar to begin”. In addition, all of them were informed that (i) a masked 253 
outcome would appear after their responses (see Figure 1), (ii) even when they could 254 
 12 
 
not to see it, the outcome for the correct responses included a picture of one of four 255 
prizes along with both a congratulation phrase and the phrase ‘You may win a (the 256 
name of the specific prize)” whereas incorrect choices would be followed by a blank 257 
screen; (ii) the four prizes would be raffled off at the end of the study; and, (iii) the 258 
more accurate their responses were, the more tickets they would win for the raffle with 259 
higher chances of winning one of the prizes. Finally, participants were also asked to 260 
choose one of the comparison shapes as quickly as possible.  261 
 Each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 1000 ms (see Figure 1). After 262 
a blank brief period of 500 ms, a visual sample stimulus was displayed for 1000 ms 263 
followed by a variable delay of 5000 ms or 25000 ms with a blank screen. Then, six 264 
comparison stimuli (the sample stimulus plus five distractor shapes) appeared and 265 
remained on the screen until the participants responded by clicking with the left mouse 266 
button on one of the shapes, or 10 seconds were elapsed, whichever occurred first. The 267 
position of the correct sample stimulus among the comparison stimuli was 268 
counterbalanced. When the response was correct, the specific outcome was presented 269 
during 17 ms (subliminal condition) or 80 ms (supraliminal condition), right in between 270 
two masked patterns that appeared for 200 ms before and after the outcome. When the 271 
response was incorrect, the screen remained blank during the same time used for the 272 
outcome presentation (17 or 80 ms). The trial was also scored as incorrect if the 273 
participant did not emit any response in 10 s.  274 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental outcomes 275 
conditions, differential (DOP; N = 21) and non-differential (NOP; N = 23). In the DOP 276 
condition, each to-be-remembered stimulus was associated with one specific outcome 277 
so that the correct response to a particular stimulus was always followed by its own 278 
consequence. In the NOP condition, each correct response was followed by the random 279 
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presentation of one of four possible outcomes. For 26 participants (12 in the DOP and 280 
14 in the NOP condition), outcomes were presented subliminally, being supraliminal for 281 
the remaining participants (N=18; 9 in the DOP and 9 in the NOP condition). All of 282 
them performed four practice trials followed by 72 training trials, grouped in six blocks 283 
of 12 trials each. The order of the blocks and the position of the correct comparison 284 
stimulus on the screen were counterbalanced across participants. At the end of the 285 
experiment, each participant had to report whether they had perceived any shape in the 286 
masked outcome screen or not. They were not told that they would be tested later. Two 287 
participants, one in the NOP condition and one in the DOP condition, reported they had 288 
perceived an image. Although none of them knew the identity of the outcome, their data 289 
were not included in the statistical analysis. 290 
In Experiment 1B, the procedure was similar to that used in the Experiment 1A 291 
with a few changes: i) The sample stimulus, instead of the outcome, was presented 292 
either subliminally (17 ms) or supraliminally (80 ms), interposed between two masked 293 
patterns that appeared for 200 ms (before and after the sample stimulus). ii) The number 294 
of sample stimuli and reinforcers was reduced from four to two. Previous pilot tests 295 
conducted in our lab revealed that when the sample stimulus was presented subliminally 296 
(instead of the outcomes), the task difficult substantially increased with participants 297 
performing close to chance.  Therefore, we reduced the number of the sample stimuli to 298 
make the task easier. iii) Instructions were modified so that participants were asked to 299 
choose one comparison shape as quickly as possible, even if they had not seen any 300 
shape before the presentation of the choice stimulus. iv) Participants were also informed 301 
that when their responses were correct, they would see a picture of a prize along with 302 
both a congratulation phrase and the phrase ‘You may win a (the name of that specific 303 
prize)’; by contrast, the screen would remain blank for several seconds after their 304 
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incorrect responses. v) The outcomes were displayed on screen for 1500 ms after the 305 
correct responses.  306 
As in Experiment 1A, participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 307 
experimental outcomes conditions, differential (DOP; N = 24) and non-differential 308 
(NOP; N = 22). For 26 participants (14 in the DOP and 12 in the NOP condition), the 309 
sample stimuli were presented subliminally; their presentation was supraliminal for the 310 
remaining participants (N=20; 10 in the DOP and 10 in the NOP condition). 311 
At the end of the experiment, as in the Experiment 1A, participants had to report 312 
whether they had noticed any shape in the masked sample stimulus screen or not. None 313 
of them reported having perceived an image. 314 
Statistical analysis 315 
Percentages of correct responses and median correct response times for each 316 
participant were submitted to a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Outcomes (DOP and 317 
NOP) and Type of presentation (subliminal and supraliminal) as the between-318 
participants factors and Delay (5s and 25 s) as the within-participants factor. The 319 
statistical significance level was set at p ≤ .05. Normality of data was checked using 320 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, and homogeneity of variance was tested using Levene’s test. 321 
Results showed the normal distribution of data and the homogeneity of variance in all 322 
variables. 323 
Results 324 
Accuracy data. In Experiment 1A, the results showed that participants were more 325 
accurate in the DOP (71% correct responses) than in the NOP condition (54% correct 326 
responses), [main effect of Outcomes, F (1,40)=15.11, p<0.001, ηp
2 =0.27]. The 327 
comparison between the subliminal and non-subliminal conditions did not show 328 
statistically significant differences [F (1,40)=2.99, p=0.091, ηp
2 =.07] (see Figure 2, 329 
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panel A). For theoretical reasons, despite the Outcomes x Type of presentation 330 
interaction not reaching significance [F (1,40)=1.10, p=0.30, ηp
2 =.02], we nevertheless 331 
tested whether the DOP showed the expected benefits in the subliminal group. The 332 
results revealed that accuracy was better in the DOP condition (72% correct responses) 333 
than in the NOP condition (60% correct responses), [main effect of Outcomes, F 334 
(1,24)=5.36, p=0.029, ηp
2 =0.18]. Similarly, in the supraliminal group, accuracy was 335 
better in the DOP condition (69% correct responses) than in the NOP condition (48% 336 
correct responses) [main effect of Outcomes, F (1,16)=9.17, p=0.008, ηp2 =0.36]. No 337 
main effect of Delay was found [F (1,40)=3.36, p=0.08, ηp2 =0.07]. No other variables 338 
nor interactions reached significance.  (ps>0.05).  339 
As mentioned earlier, the benefits of the DOP did not change depending on the 340 
type of presentation, but the mean accuracy data showed that these benefits were nearly 341 
twice as large in the supraliminal as in the subliminal condition. Subsequently we tested 342 
the equality of these outcomes conditions between the subliminal and supraliminal 343 
groups. The estimated Bayes factors (BF01) suggested that the differences in masking 344 
for the DOP group were 3:1 times in favour of the Null Hypothesis, providing 345 
substantial evidence for the equality of the group means (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). In the 346 
NOP group, there were no signs of improvement of learning due to consciousness with 347 
even a 0.7:1 tendency (albeit very weak) in favour of an unexpected alternative 348 
hypothesis that would see an increase in accuracy in subliminal rather than in the 349 













































  352 
Figure 2. Mean percentage of correct responses obtained by participants in experiments 353 
1A (panel A) and 1B (panel B) as a function of Outcomes (differential –DOP- vs. non-354 
differential –NOP-) and Type of presentation (subliminal vs. supraliminal). Error bars 355 
represent the standard deviations. 356 
In Experiment 1B, the analysis of the correct responses also revealed that those 357 
participants assigned to the DOP condition performed the task better than those who 358 
received non-differential outcomes after their correct responses (53% and 40% accuracy 359 
for the DOP and NOP conditions, respectively) [main effect of Outcomes 360 
F(1,42)=14.64, p<0.001, ηp
2 =0.26]. As in the previous experiment, there were not 361 
differences between both types of presentation (subliminal vs. supraliminal; 44% vs. 362 
49% correct responses for both conditions), [F (1,42)=2.45, p=0.13 ηp
2 =0.06] (see 363 
Figure 2, panel B). Similarly to Experiment 1, for theoretical reasons we tested whether 364 
the DOP showed the expected benefits in the subliminal group (50% and 38% correct 365 
responses in the DOP and NOP conditions, respectively) [F (1,24)=8.62, p=0.007, ηp
2 366 
=0.26]. The same effect was found when analysing data from the supraliminal group 367 
(56% and 42% correct responses in the DOP and NOP conditions, respectively) [F 368 
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(1,24)=6.13, p=0.02, ηp2 =0.254].  No main effect of Delay was found [F (1,42)=3.36, 369 
p=0.07, ηp2 =0.07], nor any interaction between the three main factors (ps>0.05).  370 
Finally, the estimated Bayes factors (BF01) suggested that the effect of the type of 371 
presentation was in favour of the null hypothesis 3:1 times for the NOP group and 2:1 372 
for the DOP group confirming the absence of an impact due to consciousness on the 373 
different types of outcomes.   374 
Latency data. The analysis of latency data from both experiments only showed 375 
a significant effect of Delay [F1A (1,40)=12.48, p<0.01, ηp
2 =0.24; F1B (1,42)=11.48, 376 
p<0.01, ηp
2 =0.21] indicating that participant’s correct responses were faster in the short 377 
than in the long delay (3117 ms vs. 3380 ms and 4035 ms vs. 3772 ms for both delays in 378 
experiments 1A and 1B, respectively). No other effects, nor their interactions, were 379 
statistically significant (ps>0.05). Table 1 shows the mean correct RTs in the task as a 380 
function of Outcomes, Type of presentation and Delay. 381 
Table 1. Median correct response times (in milliseconds) obtained by participants in 382 
experiments 1A and 1B as a function of Delay (5000 ms –short- vs. 25000 ms –long-) 383 
Outcomes (differential –DOP- vs. non-differential –NOP-) and Type of presentation 384 
(subliminal vs. supraliminal). The values in parenthesis are the standard error of the 385 
mean. 386 
 DOP NOP  DOP NOP 
Experiment 1A        Subliminal outcomes  Supraliminal outcomes 





































One relevant question we might ask is whether being aware of the specific 389 
consequences of our actions is a necessary condition for them to have beneficial effects 390 
in cognition (as demonstrated by the DOP effect). The two-memory systems theory 391 
(e.g., Savage & Ramos, 2009) would claim this not be the case, because expectancies of 392 
the specific outcomes are implicitly formed via classical conditioning associations (i.e., 393 
sample stimulus-outcome). After several pairings, the presentation of the sample 394 
stimulus would activate the representation of its own and unique outcome and this can 395 
be used to make the correct choice. This activation is meant to be automatic and non-396 
intentional, both characteristics of implicit memory systems. Thus, the unique 397 
expectancy of the outcome, represented in a prospective memory trace, could be 398 
implicitly formed and stay active for some time. Our findings are in agreement with this 399 
theory. DOP benefits in visual recognition memory were observed whether the specific 400 
outcomes were subliminal or supraliminal (Experiment 1A).  Similar results were 401 
obtained regardless of the awareness of the sample stimulus (subliminal vs. supraliminal 402 
presentation, Experiment 1B). These results clearly show that the explicit knowledge of 403 
the sample is not necessary either for it to create and activate expectancies about its 404 
unique outcome. Given that the DOP effect was evident in both experiments across all 405 
conditions, the results clearly support the idea of an implicit-prospective memory 406 
process activated when the outcomes are differentially administrated. To our 407 
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knowledge, this is the first time that the DOP effect has been reported under 408 
unconscious conditions.  409 
Regarding the NOP, results from Experiment 1B are most relevant here. If, as 410 
suggested by the two-memory systems model (e.g., Savage & Ramos, 2009), the 411 
presence of non-differential outcomes triggers an explicit retrospective memory process, 412 
then a supraliminal sample should have been better remembered than the subliminal 413 
one. However, performance was similar in both conditions. This fits with the idea that 414 
this type of retrospective memory is activated spontaneously (Mok, 2012) without a 415 
deliberate intention. In fact, it seems that only a subliminal encoding of the stimulus is 416 
enough to engage it. Based on this finding, we would no longer be referring to this 417 
retrospective memory as explicit (in which we are aware of the stimulus and keep it 418 
active in memory, Graf & Schacter, 1985). Rather, we think of it as the activation of an 419 
implicit representation of the stimulus that has just been presented. Nonetheless, it is 420 
possible that this still is the same retrospective memory processes proposed by Savage 421 
and colleagues (see also Mok, 2012 and Mok et al., 2009) largely based around the 422 
activity of the hippocampus. Accordingly, and contrary to previous theories assigning to 423 
the hippocampus an exclusive role in explicit memory, recent studies have found that 424 
this brain region is involved in both explicit and implicit memory (e.g., Addante, 2015). 425 
To further confirm this, future neuroimaging studies should investigate whether the 426 
neurobiological mechanisms activated by the DOP are the same whether the processing 427 
is conscious or not. 428 
 Finally, it is worth noting that in Experiment 1A, despite the lack of interaction 429 
between the outcomes and the type of stimulus presentation, there is still a marginally 430 
better performance in the NOP condition when the outcomes were subliminally 431 




2 =.16]. This effect could be explained in two different ways: (i) the 433 
supraliminal reward may interfere with retrospective working memory process 434 
(Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2011; Zedelius et al., 2014) or (ii) the increase in conscious 435 
working memory load (having to remember the sample stimuli plus the four explicit 436 
outcomes) may have a detrimental impact on performance (Vogel, Woodman, & Luck, 437 
2001; Awh, Barton, & Vogel, 2007). Further research is needed to clarify this issue. 438 
 To conclude, the present results are important to understand the cognitive 439 
mechanisms underlying the benefits observed in the human version of the DOP. In fact, 440 
we demonstrated that these beneficial effects depend on implicit mechanisms, as 441 
proposed by the two-memory systems, and can be observed regardless the awareness of 442 
either the sample stimulus or its associated outcome. Furthermore, we consider that 443 
these findings throw some light on how we process information in situations in which 444 
we know (consciously or not) the specific consequences of our choices. We think that, 445 
from an evolutionary perspective, being able to predict these consequences has been so 446 
crucial for survival that its benefits are observed even when they are unconscious. Thus, 447 
as soon as a stimulus-unique outcome association can be established, the way the brain 448 
processes the information seems to change to an implicit-prospective manner; helping 449 
optimizing the functioning of cognitive processes involved in memory and learning.  450 
This research has strong implications when applying the differential outcomes 451 
methodology at different stages of human brain development, in patients who have 452 
diminished conscious processing for a variety of reasons (such as brain injury or 453 
neurodegenerative impairments), or with disabilities specifically affecting explicit 454 
memory and/or executive functions (e.g., patients diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease, 455 
Cushing’s syndrome or schizophrenia). Similarly, because we have shown that explicit 456 
knowledge of consequences would not be necessary for the DOP to improve memory 457 
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and learning processes, our results further support its use as a powerful learning tool in 458 
educational contexts from early childhood to older people with or without cognitive 459 
deficits. 460 
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